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Industrial control systems increasingly use standard communication protocols and are increasingly 
connected to public networks – creating substantial cyber-security risks, especially when used in 
critical infrastructures such as electricity and water distribution systems. Methods of assessing risk in 
such systems have recognized for some time the way in which the strategies of potential adversaries 
and risk managers interact in defining the risk to which such systems are exposed. But it is also 
important to consider the adaptations of the systems’ operators and other legitimate users to risk 
controls, adaptations which often appear to undermine these controls, or shift the risk from one part of 
a system to another. Unlike the case with adversarial risk analysis, the adaptations of system users are 
typically orthogonal to the objective of minimizing or maximizing risk in the system. We argue that 
this need to analyze potential adaptations to risk controls is true for risk problems more generally, and 
we develop a framework for incorporating such adaptations into an assessment process. The method is 
based on the principle of affordances, and we show how this can be incorporated in an iterative 
procedure based on raising the minimum period of risk materialization above some threshold. We 
apply the method in a case study of a small European utility provider, and discuss the observations 











It has become widely recognized that industrial control systems are inherently vulnerable to the risk of 
cybersecurity failure as they become extensively connected to the public network. Modern societies 
rely heavily on such systems for their basic utilities and production processes(1), much of which 
constitutes ‘critical national infrastructure’(2). Yet ‘decades of competition have led to infrastructure 
that is very lean and very fragile’(3). The vulnerability was vividly illustrated by the Stuxnet and 
Flame events in 2010 and 2012 (4), a recent attack on the control systems of a German steelworks (5), 
and even more recently the attack on parts of the Ukrainian electricity distribution system(6) (7). 
In some ways networked industrial control systems have an inherent resilience because an 
attacker intending a specific harm not only has to achieve privileged access to physical controllers, or 
the data coming from physical sensors, but needs specific engineering knowledge to achieve physical 
damage. However, in some ways they have an inherent vulnerability because they offer a virtual, 
remote pathway to physical damage that does not require physical proximity, physical intrusion or 
physical action. An attacker who can shut down a SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data 
Acquisition) server can cause considerable, non-specific disruption. And when such systems control 
basic infrastructures, such as water and electricity distribution, there is a large-scale risk at a societal 
level. 
Assessing risk of this kind has much in common with assessing risk from deliberate, 
adversarial action in other types of system. Those working in this area have long recognized the need 
to analyse how defensive actions influence adversarial actions, and have used decision theoretic or 
game theoretic approaches to represent this adaptation. In this paper, however, we argue that there has 
been very little recognition of how the system at risk – in particular legitimate operators and 
organizations – also adapts to security measures and risk controls over time, sometimes nullifying 
those controls, and sometimes displacing rather than mitigating risk. We suggest that it is important to 
anticipate such adaptations, and to use some systematic theory to anticipate when and how adaptation 
occurs. We base our approach on the principle of affordances(8) (9) from ecological psychology, which 
appears especially suited to anticipating potential adaptations because of its emphasis on the fit 
4 
 
between an entity and its environment in terms of the action possibilities this fit creates. We show 
how the resulting framework can be applied in a case study of small utility serving a town in Europe. 
In the remainder of this paper we briefly review the relevant literature, describe the proposed method 
of analysis, show how it was applied, and discuss its contributions and limitations. 
 
 
2 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Risk and industrial control systems 
Past work on analyzing risk in industrial control systems has tackled a wide variety of issues. It has 
developed methods for assessing threats based on general systems theory(10) (11) (12), assessing risks 
arising specifically from automated and robotic systems(13) and assessing vulnerability and 
survivability in complex industrial controls(14). It has also produced more specific methods of risk 
assessment – for example using fuzzy logic for verifying safety criteria in nuclear power plants(15), 
applying hybridized probabilistic and AI-based approaches to real-time risk controls in systems such 
as gas compressors on offshore production platforms(16), and applying simulation approaches to the 
complex dynamics in chemical batch reactors(17).  
Methods have been developed for analysing dependency in access control systems(18), the 
vulnerability of inter-dependent SCADA  systems to cascade failures(19), reliability in the control 
room operations of process control systems(20), and risk in digital controls(21). Some of our 
understanding is about the particular risks associated with specific industries – such as water 
distribution systems(22) (23). But other work has been concerned with techniques to deal with the 
general problems of analysing risk in control systems, for example the use of hierarchical Bayesian 
approaches to address the sparsity of empirical data about rare failures(24), and petri net approaches to 
deal with state space explosion problems in analysing the safety of digital control systems(25). 
Cyber security risks to industrial control systems, specifically, have received increasing 
attention, especially when they form part of what is regarded as critical infrastructure. For example, 
Henry and Haimes(26) develop an extensive model of security risk in process control networks. Ralston 
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et al(27) provide a broad view of concerns and risk assessment methodologies for SCADA and 
Distributed Control Systems (DCS). Kundur et al(28) present a framework for assessing the impact of 
cyberattacks on smart grids, synthesising analysis of both the information and physical systems. 
Naedele(29) presents a review of commonly discussed SCADA security challenges, including the 
newly interconnected nature of control systems, and the use of commercial off-the-shelf products. 
Fleury et al(30) develop a taxonomy of attacks against energy control systems. And various studies use 
a range of different formalisms for risk and reliability assessments. For example Zhang et al(31) use 
Bayesian attack graph models to analyze attacks on SCADA elements in an electricity distribution 
system, while Ten et al(32) use petri nets for a similar purpose. Other instructive applications of similar 
methods include Henry et al’s(33) (34) use of petri nets to represent the coupled development of attacks 
on a computer network and failure of physical control, and Ingols et al’s(35) use of attack graphs to 
model both attacks and counter-measures, and to automate the process of risk assessment. 
However we argue below that there is a problem which has not yet received much attention in 
this literature: the way in which a complex sociotechnical system inevitably adapts in some way to 
any attempt to protect it – and the need to recognize this in the risk assessment and management 
process. Henry and Haimes(26)  (2009) took the step of building into their framework the analysis of 
candidate risk controls. We take the further step of building in the analysis of adaptations of the 
system to those controls. As we discuss in detail later, this involves anticipating how such controls 
provoke legitimate system operators and users to change their behavior. This then requires iterating 
through the risk assessment and control identification process, recognizing such adaptive behavior, 
and continuing until risks are judged acceptable. This inherent iteration is not intended to reduce 
uncertainty in some general sense, as in certain other approaches(36), but to find the state in which a 
system exhibits acceptable risk even after it has adapted to newly-applied risk controls. 
 
2.2 Risk of deliberate harm 
The general problem of how to assess risk of harm that is inflicted deliberately, by some adversary, 
has received considerable attention. There are surveys and comparative views of the different methods 
– both decision theoretic and game theoretic, and combinations of these – that can be used for risk 
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assessment with intelligent adversaries(37) (38). There are assessment frameworks dealing with specific 
problems, such as the identification of critical assets(39), and incomplete information about early 
moves in adversarial games(40). There are also empirical models of terrorism risk estimated from 
regional characteristics(41), and of cyber security incidents and their effects on internet traffic(42). 
Terrorism risk has attracted particular interest. Special journal issues show a range of 
concerns and approaches, including the effects of terrorist attacks on utilities(43), the use of historical 
data on disturbances to analyze utility risk(44), and methods for assessing the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructures(45). Recent work provides assessment methods for terrorist threats to airports 
specifically(46), and methods that recognize the interaction of counter-measures in a portfolio-based 
analysis(47). A central aspect of much of this work is the mutual adaptation between attackers and 
defenders. McGill et al(39), for instance, deals with attacker preference changes in response to security 
measures. Merrick and Parnell(37) explicitly refer to the attacker adaptations to defender decisions and 
advocate further development of adaptive adversary risk assessment, and Rios and Rios Insua(38) 
(2012) similarly deal with strategic adversaries. Bier’s(48) work shows how game theoretic models 
capture significant aspects of the decision problem faced by risk managers anticipating, with 
uncertainty, the responses of adversaries – such as the centralization of defensive choices, and choices 
to leave targets undefended. Research such as that of Chatterjee et al(47) similarly shows how we can 
deal with the interactions between risk controls that seem inevitable in systems of any complexity.  
Much of this work has come to be called Adversarial Risk Analysis and is characterized by 
having two decision makers with opposing interests rather than the single decision maker of 
traditional, probabilistic risk analysis(49) . Its main limitation, as a general approach to analysis, is that 
it deals with the way adversaries adapt to risk controls but not how non-adversaries – such as a 
system’s operators – also adapt to such controls. Our aim in this paper is to argue that this is a 
significant problem, and to propose a way of dealing with it. We also argue that this problem, in 
general terms, has a key difference from that of adversarial risk analysis. In adversarial analysis, it is 
typically reasonable to portray the attacker as having the opposite motivation to the defender – to 
maximize rather than minimize the risk. But it would be unreasonable to portray legitimate system 
operators and users in this way. The reason they adapt to risk controls is not in order to nullify or 
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avoid those controls but to pursue some orthogonal objective, such as reducing time and intellectual 
or physical effort. Therefore to predict their adaptations we need another theory, one not primarily 
concerned with risk. Our approach is to base this on the idea of affordances, as explained and justified 
below. 
 
2.3 The adaptation problem 
It is not hard to anticipate how attempts to make passwords more secure by forcing them to be more 
complex can lead to individuals writing them down, using the same passwords on multiple systems, 
sharing them with colleagues, and adopting other insecure practices. It would not be surprising if 
people forced to go through extensive authentication processes leave computers logged-on when they 
leave their desks unattended. It is quite likely that people having to exchange emergency information 
in a crisis will break rules that prohibit the sharing of confidential information. More generally, any 
attempt to intervene in a complex adaptive system, in order to control risk, is likely to produce an 
unexpected and perhaps self-defeating response(50). 
This principle that risks are defined as much by a system’s adaptations as by exogenous 
threats is central to some theories of disaster, such as Vaughan’s(51) idea of ‘normalized deviance’. It 
occurs in Reason’s(52) model of organizations operating in a protection-production space, in which 
gains in protection are typically exchanged for gains in production. And it emerges in observations of 
risk migration, when attempts to manage risk simply transform it from one type to another(53). 
Phenomena such as risk compensation and risk homeostasis(54) indicate that people adapt to risk 
controls even when they realise this adaptation can undermine those controls. Similarly, work on the 
violation of information security policies intended to control risk(55) shows how readily people can 
rationalise such violations. 
Adaptation to technical risk controls – such as aircraft collision avoidance technology – has 
been implicated in large-scale risk events such as the Überlingen disaster(56). But adaptation is 
especially likely in connection with social controls and the control of social elements of system 
vulnerability. Much of what we know about counter-productive adaptation to risk controls involves 
the use of organizational rules in particular(51) (57) (58) (59) (60). In the security context, many modes of 
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attack are largely technical, involving vulnerabilities and associated exploits in specific software and 
hardware components. Yet many modes of attack involve ‘social engineering’(61), for which social 
controls are often the most important and sometimes the only feasible form of risk mitigation. It is 
these that are the most liable to provoke adaptations when implemented.  
 
 
3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD 
 
3.1 A synopsis 
We first summarize the basic principles of the proposed approach, before explaining the detail. Figure 
1 shows the essential ecology. There is an interaction between risk manager and adversary as they 
create and encounter protective measures in the system, with broadly opposing objectives of trying to 
minimize or maximize risk. There is also an interaction between risk manager and legitimate users of 
the system (which includes those operating and maintaining it), through the protective measures 
created by risk managers and negotiated, confronted, accepted or bypassed by the users. The users 
broadly have the objective of achieving some level of convenience, minimizing effort, or generally 
being able to engage in some task without impedance.  
---------------- 
Figure 1 here 
---------------- 
The analysis is based on the principle of affordances – the action possibilities created by the fit 
between an actor and its environment. Its starting point is a graph that represents how risks materialize 
over time during attacks on a system. The edges in this graph are the affordances presented to the 
adversary by the vulnerabilities of a system. The materialization of a risk involves spanning the graph 
from a starting node to some node at which harm takes place. Edges in the graph are weighted by the 
uncertain time taken to exploit these affordances, and the first aim of the assessment is to find the path 
of least duration spanning the graph from start to end nodes. This is a heuristic intended to minimize 
the effort needed for the subsequent analysis. It assumes that if all paths can be raised above some 
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minimum duration, the system is resilient to a required degree because intrusion along all such paths 
can be detected and intercepted. If the shortest path falls below this minimum, candidate risk controls 
have to be identified, and an attempt is made to anticipate how these controls change the affordances 
experienced by legitimate users of the system. This predicts how such users might exploit alternative 
affordances. The final step, before iterating, is to assess how this then changes the original adversary 
affordance graph. The process repeats until the minimum path duration is acceptable.  
 In this approach risk is not measured directly, and the test of acceptable risk is not that a 
direct measure of risk falls below some risk acceptance threshold. Instead the test is that the time for a 
risk to materialize rises above some minimum tolerable handling time. This avoids the need to 
quantify the probability of an adversary choosing a specific method of attack – an inherently 
problematic requirement(3). And it more clearly concerns the capacity of the system to withstand 
attack. Figure 2 outlines the method and in the remainder of this section we explain and justify the 
method in detail, discussing separately the main components of the analysis. In Section 4 we apply the 
method to a case study. 
---------------- 
Figure 2 here 
---------------- 
 
3.2 The affordance principle 
 Affordances are the possibilities for action in an environment that fit an actor’s capabilities(8) (9). It is 
this idea of fit between actor and environment, expressed in terms of potential actions, that makes the 
affordance principle so promising as a basis for identifying adaptations. Affordances often advertise 
themselves in some sense – being action possibilities that actors notice and are motivated to exploit(62) 
(63). But they emerge in the relationship between actor and environment, and do not inhere in either 
separately(64). 
 There are various ways in which the affordance concept has been formalized, and Sahin et 
al(65) provide a brief survey. Stoffregen’s(64) approach is to express affordances as a ‘higher-order’ 
property of the actor-environment system in the form of a relation between ‘lower-order’ properties of 
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actors and environments within that system. Chemero(66), who reviews earlier attempts at formulating 
a theory of affordances, sees them as relations between ‘features’ of an environment and ‘abilities’ of 
an organism. Steedman’s(67) approach is to stress the way in which an affordance provides a linear 
implication from some pre-condition to a post-condition. And Sahin et al(65) incorporate the effect of 
an affordance into its definition. We follow this approach, broadly, considering the effect as a cost 
that can be used to predict how an actor might choose among competing affordances(63) (68) (69). Thus 
we generally represent an affordance f ∈F as a tuple f = <φ, χ, π, κ, σs, σd> in which φ ∈Φ is a 
relevant feature of the environment, χ ∈ Χ is a relevant property of an actor, π ∈ Π is the action 
possibility, κ ∈ Κ is some cost of exploiting this, σs ∈ Σ is a source state in which the action 
possibility is available (that is, a pre-condition) and σd ∈ Σ a destination state which exploitation of 
the action possibility produces (the post-condition). This is illustrated in Figure 3, showing how an 
affordance consists of an action possibility produced in the relationship between a feature of an 
actor’s environment and its own properties. This action possibility, when exploited, makes a transition 
from source to destination states at some cost. 
---------------- 
Figure 3 here 
---------------- 
 In practice, large parts of the affordance space can remain unspecified. In the analysis of the 
attack risk, as we explain below, the actor properties are irrelevant because no attempt is made to 
predict attacker decisions. Their properties (such as skill levels) are regarded as being random, in 
order to avoid making fragile assumptions about people and groups that analysts may have little 
knowledge about. On the other hand, in the analysis of user adaptations to risk controls, where the 
pre- and post-conditions are not informative, it is these that are left unspecified. 
 
3.3 The attack affordance graph  
Stoffregen(70) points out that affordances are often nested, and this is clearly the case for an attacker,  
for whom one affordance’s destination state is a subsequent affordance’s source state.  For example, 
11 
 
contemporary accounts of the recent cyber attack on Ukrainian electricity distribution(6) (7) indicated 
that malware was introduced through an email attachment, infiltration was from the operators’ 
business networks into their control networks, and the attackers could then directly control breakers in 
the distribution system. Prior work in this area similarly represents attacks as developing 
progressively. It is thus commonly based on attack trees or graphs, Markov processes, state space 
models, Bayesian networks and so on(71) (72) (31) (73), in which the central feature is that being in one 
state gives access to another. 
 To represent this progressive materialization through the sequential exploitation of 
affordances, our approach also uses a directed, acyclic graph R  = < N, E > of nodes N and edges E. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. Each node n = <y, v> is a state in which an attacker has access to a 
particular device y∈Y (for example a computer, router, programmable logic controller (PLC) and so 
on), at a particular level of privilege v∈V. This is similar to prior work, such as McQueen et al’s(74) 
‘compromise graph’.  Each edge e ∈E is associated with an affordance f = <φ, π, κ, σs, σd> where σs, 
σd (the source and destination states) are its source and destination nodes ns = <ys, vs> and nd = <yd, 
vd>. The environmental feature φ  is typically some vulnerability in device ys, and the action 
possibility π  is some exploit available to someone having access at level vs to ys. As described in 
section 3.4, the graph is weighted by a measure of time, so it is natural to associate this time with the 
cost of the affordance although, as we explain, this is not used to predict an attacker’s decisions. 
---------------- 
Figure 4 here 
---------------- 
What is of interest are paths P from a specific starting access state nstart, to which no edges 
point, to a state of access to harm nharm from which no edges emerge. A path essentially defines a 
‘risk’: some route from the status quo to a harm, with an associated probability and consequence. The 
materialization of a risk involves traversing the associated path, and this generally defines a trajectory 
of increasing privilege to devices with increasing proximity to physical processes. A risk control c  ∈C 




3.4 The time metric 
The basic principle is to estimate the uncertain exploitation time that it would take to traverse the 
edges in the affordance graph, and find the minimum time to span the graph from start node to harm 
node. This focus on the shortest path in the network does not assume that attackers will always take 
the shortest path, but does assume that if an attack on the shortest path can be intercepted (because the 
shortest path is greater than some threshold time) then any attack on a longer path can also be 
intercepted. ‘Interception’ could mean preventing the further development of any attack beyond a 
certain node through a periodic software patching cycle, or could mean the detection of a specific 
attack through periodic audit and monitoring activity. This focus on the shortest path is a heuristic that 
makes the process substantially more economical, as will become evident in Section 3.4, but it is just 
a heuristic and it is possible to imagine circumstances in which it will not work. These are discussed 
further in Section 5.2.  
 A range of methods is available for eliciting the probability distributions over the estimated 
edge times (see for example the survey by Garthwaite et al(75). The choice needs to be based on what, 
in a particular context, is a suitable statistic for a subject area expert to judge and whether, for 
example, a judge is better able to estimate absolute bounds or quantiles(76). We choose to use van 
Dorp’s(76) procedure based on a family of two-sided power distributions, which has a bounded domain 
and straightforward definition that subject area experts are likely to find intuitive: 
    λ ((t - tmin)/(tmode - tmin))n-1 for tmin < t < tmode 
f(t | tmin, tmode, tmax, n) = 
λ ((tmax - t)/(tmax - tmode))n-1 for tmode ≤ t < tmax 
where λ  = n/(tmax - tmin) 
Figure 5 illustrates f() for a fixed choice of tmin, tmode, tmax, with varying n. It is uniform for n = 1. Its 
use requires expert estimation of an exponent n as well as the bounding and modal values of t, for 
example by choosing from distributions expressed pictorially. Van Dorp(76) also describes a method 
that avoids eliciting the bounding values, instead eliciting quantiles and deriving the bounding values 
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from these. But in a context such as ours it appears no easier to elicit quantiles than bounds, and the 
procedure for deriving the latter from the former is complex, approximate and opaque. 
---------------- 
Figure 5 here 
---------------- 
Prior methods such as McQueen et al’s(74) find the expected duration of paths spanning the 
graph from start to end states, adding means of relevant edges. But there may be an appreciable 
probability that the shortest mean path is not the shortest path, and that the materialization time for a 
risk is substantially less than the mean. So it makes sense to estimate, for each path, the duration for 
which there is some probability Q it will be exceeded by an actual duration – for example to find the 
path durations t0.95(pi) that are exceeded with Q  = 0.95, and to iterate through the process of 
identifying risk controls and adaptations until the shortest path duration Mini [tQ(pi)] is greater than the 
threshold duration T (which, in the case study below, is 24 days). We use a simple Monte Carlo 
procedure, assuming edge durations are independent. 
It is difficult to specify a sensitivity analysis because, as explained further below, the procedure 
iterates through qualitative judgments of appropriate risk controls, anticipated adaptations to the 
controls, and expected ramifications of the adaptations. The most important outcome of the 
quantitative analysis at each iteration is the selection of the shortest path through the graph for 
comparison with the acceptable minimal path duration. It therefore becomes necessary to know 
whether the selection of the shortest path is marginal, and sensitive to small changes in the elicited 
probability distributions. So we measure the probability that the duration of any path could be less 
than that of the shortest, qerror (pi) = Pr[tQ(pi) < tQ(pmin)], again using a Monte Carlo procedure. Then 
qerror is made available for a decision about whether to revisit the estimation of the durations 
associated with the edges in the shorter paths through the graph. 
There are various alternatives to these assumptions about appropriate distributions, elicitation 
procedures and acceptance criteria. The evidence on expert elicitation seems to suggest that mode 
estimates are reasonably accurate, but that estimates of variances and distribution tails are less so(75) 
(Garthwaite et al, 2005), so how judgments about probabilistic time should be expressed remains in 
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need of further exploration. It is not the main component of our method, and not its particular 
contribution, so we pass over these issues here. 
 
3.5 The user adaptation problem 
Our central concern is to anticipate how legitimate actors such as users adapt to potential risk controls 
C, when these modify the affordances they currently experience, Flegit, and how this in turn modifies 
the attack affordance graph R. It would be an extremely onerous task to identify Flegit completely. 
However, an analyst only needs to identify controls (perhaps only one control) for what is currently 
the shortest path in the attack affordance graph, and the effect of a new control might only be to 
change the costs of existing affordances rather than to add completely new affordances or completely 
withdraw old ones. 
Having identified the way a proposed control c impedes some prior affordance f = (φ, χ, π, κ) by 
modifying its cost to κ post, for example, the analyst needs to anticipate how such a modification might 
provoke an adaptation. This involves the user exploiting some other affordance f’ in place of f, if f’ 
achieves the same goal as f, and does so at a lower cost. In this case, the relevant user property in the 
affordance definition, χ, is the user’s goal. So we expect f’ to substitute for f if both χ' = χ, and κ' < κ 
post. An example we give in Section 4 is where attacks via malicious emails suggest controls that 
prohibit file exchange by email. This kind of control might provoke legitimate users into making file 
exchanges by USB (Universal Serial Bus) devices – dropping the affordance f of exchanging a file 
(the goal χ) by email when they have access to a device (some φ), because the cost κ post involves the 
possibility of disciplinary action. Instead the affordance f’ of exchanging a file using a USB drive is 
now taken up. 
Finally, the analyst has to anticipate the effects of exploiting f’ on R. In particular, it can modify 
the traversal times for the edges, making certain attack paths longer or (more likely) shorter. In the 
example in Section 4, the routine use of USB drives is expected to make illicit use of USB ports less 
noticeable, discourage system managers from disabling USB ports on devices in public places (like 
15 
 
some of the utility’s commercial offices), and lead users to be less suspicious of USB drives left in 
such places. This modifies a number of edges in R, including one on the shortest path.  
The process in practice relies heavily on expert judgment, requiring deep social understanding of 
the goals that legitimate users are pursuing, the alternative ways they have to meet them, and how 
these can make attacker moves more or less difficult. The procedure moves from the domain of an 
attacker’s affordances to that of users, and then back again. These two domains have some common 
ground in terms of shared features of the environment (the states of access on various devices), but the 
affordances are directed to orthogonal purposes. But the analyst’s task is limited: there is no need to 
identify user affordances Flegit completely, only the affordances f modified by introducing a candidate 
control, and the alternative affordances f’ that share a goal with the modified f. There is also no need 
to identify the space of user goals Χ completely, only the shared goal χ(f, f’) for the modified f.  
 
3.6 An orientation process 
As the process is founded on a series of expert judgments it is important to ensure these are well-
informed, and this is not just a matter of developing a coherent analytical framework but also of 
having a systematic process of engagement between expert and system under analysis. Assessment of 
social engineering attack time distributions, in particular, is contextual and judgmental. It has to be 
informed by a social process in which the analyst engages. 
Gollman’s(77) basic taxonomy of an attack – under the headings of ‘impact’ (states of harm), 
‘exposure’ (actors intending some harm), and ‘vulnerability’ (states of the system facilitating the 
harm) – provides a way of organizing this process of engagement. This suggests the following main 
elements: 
1) ‘Impact’ requires identification of the primary attack target(s) within the industrial control system. 
These are states of harm, which the system offers affordances to reach.  
2) ‘Exposure’ requires identification of actors who illegitimately experience these affordances. 




3) ‘Vulnerability’ requires identification of the affordances offering direct and derived access to the 
targets. This will typically require a) identification of device interconnections and perimeter 
devices; b) search for poor configuration and lack of security patching; c) assessment of social 
norms, cues and responses; d) discovery of responsibilities and competences for protection. 
This process is ad hoc and reliant on the artfulness of the analyst. But the principle of affordances 
remains the guiding idea. It is the inherent fit between attacker capabilities and system functions that 
create the risk, and the fit between legitimate user capabilities and system functions that create 
adaptations when risk controls are introduced. These need to be the focus of the analyst’s 
familiarization with, and orientation to, the organization and system under assessment. 
 
 
4 APPLICATION OF THE METHOD 
 
4.1 The organization and its systems 
To illustrate the use of the method, it was applied in a small utility providing the final distribution of a 
commodity to consumers in a specific region of a European state. For reasons of confidentiality and 
security the organization has been anonymized, and some of the analysis simplified and changed. The 
orientation process described in Section 3.6 involved an intensive two-day’s work by a researcher 
who, until recently, had worked as a computer security professional for five years in the specific field 
of industrial control systems. He carried out interviews, worked through documentation, and 
undertook some basic vulnerability analysis at the organization’s site. The primary observations from 
the orientation process were as follows:  
1) The primary target was a single SCADA server with affordances to various types of harm, most 
obviously the disruption of service to domestic or commercial consumers. An attacker would be 
able delay the restoration of service by excluding access for legitimate users, typically by 
changing all account passwords. 
2) The candidate sources of an attack were multiple, and included disenchanted former employees. 
The different types of attacker were associated with distinct affordances. For example, former 
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employees had greater affordances for certain elements of ‘social engineering’, whereas remote 
attackers with technical capabilities were associated with the affordances presented by technical 
vulnerabilities in certain systems. 
3) The vulnerabilities were both social and technical. Interviews suggested a susceptibility to 
malicious emails as employees appeared willing to open messages and attachments from known 
senders. Firewalls had been configured to allow direct remote access for subcontractors who 
interacted with certain subsystems from remote locations over the public Internet.  
4) There was public accessibility to machines with exposed, active USB ports. And there was a 
strong culture of treating clients as clients, not as vulnerabilities or threats. This helped the 
organization serve its community in a principled way, but suggested a possible reluctance to see 
clients as potential sources of vulnerability or threat. 
The ways in which specific utilities become vulnerable to specific risks is documented and modelled 
in the literature: for example Zechman(23) on water distribution systems, and Zhang et al(31) on 
electrical distribution systems. But this understanding of local conditions is an important element in a 
risk assessment of a particular system in a particular social organization. 
 
4.2 The first iteration 
Figure 6 shows the initial graph of attack affordances in the organization. Moving from left to right 
moves to access on devices that are increasingly close to physical controls with increasing privilege. 
There is a single start node, denoting an undifferentiated state in which any attack begins. There is a 
single end node denoting a state in which the attacker causes physical harm. The remaining nodes 
define access to some entity (for example ‘Eng WS’, denoting an engineering workstation and ‘File 
SRV’ denoting a file server) at some level of privilege (for example ‘@ Root’, denoting root or 
administrator level). The system under analysis was a very small one. Its computing network had 
three perimeter nodes, one accessible locally via Wi-Fi, one accessible over the public Internet, and 
one configured within a so-called DMZ (‘De-militarized zone’) on a gateway router. These define the 
early states of access in the graph, directly linked to the ‘Start’ node. Access with root privilege on a 
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) server was the primary target in the sense that it 
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enabled a user to alter physical processes and states of operational sites. Henry and Haimes(26) argue 
that it is naïve to specify targets, as these emerge in practice as an attack progresses. But in such a 
simple system as this one, it seems reasonable to do so. There were also programmable logic 
controllers linked to the network but these were excluded from the analysis by request of the 
operating organization. The graph has been somewhat modified to avoid undue disclosure, and 
simplified to aid exposition. Some edges were feasible, in the analyst’s judgment, but did not form 
part of a coherent failure path and so were excluded. In general, the shorter paths through the 
affordance network (for example those in which there is a direct connection from the ‘Start’ node to 
later nodes such as root-level access on an engineering work station), involve some kind of social 
engineering. 
---------------- 
Figure 6 here 
---------------- 
Table I shows the analyst’s exploitation time estimates, in days, for each edge. As McQueen et al(74) 
argue, the expertise of the attacker is clearly relevant to exploitation time (or ‘time to compromise’ in 
their work), but it is also relevant to the frequency of attacks – and in this case more frequent attacks 
were expected from less expert attackers. The probability distribution over exploitation times 
expresses the analyst’s judgments over all sources of exploitation for each edge. Most edges have a 
common minimum of 1 day reflecting the analyst’s assumption that an attack would not proceed over 
N affordances in less than N days. Many edges in this particular analysis share a common maximum 
of 21 days, particularly those associated with technical rather than socially-engineered modes of 
attack. McQueen et al suggest this as a general value where there are no known vulnerabilities and 
exploits and the attacker has an expert level of capability. We make no assumptions about capabilities, 
so this estimate is conservative. The exponent value, common to all entries, gives a distribution with 
substantial weight in the tails, indicating a relatively large uncertainty for the analyst. 
---------------- 




Table II shows the paths pi in this graph, together with associated values of duration, t0.90(pi), the 
durations for which the probability of exceedance is 0.90. The table also shows the mean durations 
E[t(pi)] and the probabilities qerror (pi) = Pr[t0.90(pi) < t0.90(pmin)] that the paths may be shorter than the 
identified shortest path. 
---------------- 
Table II here 
---------------- 
The analysis shows a primarily technical path, path 14, to be the shortest. The control proposed at this 
stage was a technical one, reconfiguring the WAN/LAN (Wide Area Network/Local Area Network) 
gateway such that a port formerly open to the public Internet is brought within a firewall. There were 
no affordances that were modified by the introduction of this control in the analyst’s judgment.  
 
4.3 The second iteration 
The second graph is a trivial adaptation of the first, modifying the exploitation time distribution for 
two edges (edges 16 and 17). On re-analysis, path 6 was then the shortest according to t0.90(p6). But 
this duration remained below the acceptance threshold of 24 days. The path involved a spear-phishing 
attack giving direct root access to the engineering work station, for example via a PDF (Portable 
Document Format) attachment that is vulnerable to an exploit in a PDF viewer, or via an executable 
file disguised with a .pdf extension. The analyst had discovered, unsurprisingly, that most employees 
in the organization would open an email attachment with high probability if apparently sent from 
another employee, and if it appeared to be technical in nature they would open it anyway – almost 
regardless of its source (for example if it appeared to be a consumer emailing them with a supposed 
photograph of a defective installation).  
 The obvious risk control was to prohibit email attachments, introducing an organizational rule 
that forbids the opening of received attachments and forbids file attachments on sent emails. But fairly 
clearly this reduces the affordance for legitimate users – the organization’s employees – to exchange 
files via email attachments and the analyst judged it highly likely that employees would simply violate 
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the rule. This would restore the legitimate users’ affordance but nullify the effect of the control, 
leaving the attack affordance graph virtually unchanged.  
 
4.4 The third iteration 
The analyst therefore proposed the automatic removal of all file attachments from emails received in 
the organization. Again this undermines the affordance provided by the email system to share files, 
but this affordance cannot be restored by simple rule violation. Users of the system are therefore 
likely to substitute competing affordances for achieving the same goal. The most obvious competing 
affordance was provided by USB drives. In the analyst’s judgment, the result would be that the use of 
USB drives would become normal and habitual, and that employees would not find it suspicious when 
an unidentified USB drive was observed in a USB port. Moreover, there were several office work 
stations in a public area with exposed, enabled USB ports – allowing a visitor to insert surreptitiously 
a USB device with key logging or wireless access. This led to a modification of the exploitation times 
attached to edge 2 in another path (path 7) in the affordance network – a path that involved socially 
engineered strategies using USB drives. The analysis of the modified graph made path 7 the shortest, 
with a t0.90(p7) of 22 days, which remained below the 24 day acceptance threshold. 
 
4.5 The fourth iteration 
The final iteration involved finding a control on this second path – involving the blocking of USB 
ports in public spaces, and the provision to staff of distinctively-marked USB drives for all file 
sharing activity. The analyst could identify no relevant affordances that were materially affected, and 
the control brought the shortest path just above the criterion threshold.  
 For such a small example this kind of iteration is likely to be intuitive and regarded as part of 
what we would expect a competent organization to do as a matter of course. But some of the steps laid 
out here had not been obvious to the organization in question. It had no systematic knowledge of the 
possible routes of attack laid out in the attack affordance graph, it had no specific understanding of 
which paths were the ones that presented the greatest vulnerability given their possible traversal times, 
and it had no planned series of risk controls. There was no apparent appreciation of the way in which, 
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if it did have to introduce additional controls, this could lead to adaptations that might create or 
amplify further risks. The outcome of the analysis was therefore not only a better-protected system, 
but also a deepening of the organization’s understanding of its own systems and their vulnerabilities, 
and of its own responses to these vulnerabilities. 
 
 
5  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Contributions of the method 
Although this study is about a specific class of risk – deliberate attacks on industrial control systems – 
its basic premise and method are more general. Any system which receives some intervention to 
control risk can adapt to that intervention and change the risk in a way that was not the intention 
behind the control. Therefore assessment should naturally be an iterative process – and our aim was to 
propose a method for carrying it out. This method makes the iteration relatively economical, by 
concentrating attention on the shortest known risk materialization path. And it makes the iteration 
relatively systematic, by using a consistent principle (that of affordances) to anticipate adaptations to 
risk controls. The iteration reflects the fundamental idea that risk is reflexive, and that knowing about 
a risk almost inevitably changes it in some way. 
The principle that these adaptations take place because risk controls change affordances 
appears to be a general one. And the affordances principle has a big advantage. Because affordances 
concern the relationship between actors and environments in terms of actions, they help predict in a 
direct way how a change in behavior might follow a change to system. We do not have to predict how 
actors build their representations of the system and work out their plans for using it(69), because actors 
‘pick up’ affordances in a direct and effortless way(78) . This directness makes affordances a plausible 
explanation of what happens and also a more practical way of predicting what can happen. They offer 
‘considerable heuristic guidance’(64) when we search for possible adaptations. There are various 
developments of the affordance principle that on face value appear to suit risk analysis – notably the 
idea of affordances as probabilistic functions(79). But to adopt such ideas would involve quantifying an 
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attackers’ probability of acting in a particular way, a step fraught with the difficulties of estimating 
how such probabilities will change as attackers discover information about the system they are 
targeting(3). So it is the basic idea of an affordance that appears to have most relevant to risk 
assessment generally. 
We have also suggested there has to be a clear ‘orientation’ process. This is not part of the 
formalized structure of the assessment procedure but it is an essential part of putting it into practice. 
In our case study, for example, the analyst found that to predict how system users would react 
required provoking them into responding – confronting them with typical malicious emails and 
getting them to describe what actions they would take. The analyst also only found out through 
physical engagement that an important vulnerability was created by a system that had been configured 
to give remote access to a camera server used by an external organization to monitor the 
organization’s protected sites. This orientation process is especially important in an iterative 
assessment that takes account of possible adaptations, because the analyst needs not just a record of 
the system as it currently exists but also an understanding of the affordances that people in the system 
currently exploit – and what they might do if those affordances were modified.  
 
5.2 Limitations and further work 
Because our intention was to analyze the adaptations of the legitimate system and its users we have 
neglected a range of issues addressed in earlier work. We do not deal with the adaptations of 
adversaries to risk controls(39) (37) (38), which includes the possibility that risk controls may 
inadvertently create new affordances for an attacker. We do not address the interactions between 
different risk controls(47). We do not deal with the effects on dependent infrastructures(80), and we 
ignore the costs of risk measures, which form an important component of other methods(46). We also 
neglect the problem of multiple actors facing independent choices about protective actions that are 
nonetheless inter-dependent(81). And we do not address the analysis of threat agents, their capacities, 
incentives and motivations. Further work is therefore needed to synthesize all these elements in some 
way, although the complexities of the individual methods suggest a single, over-arching method may 
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not be feasible. Perhaps what we should be looking for is a way of defining individual methods in 
such a way that they can be selected and combined for the purposes of any specific risk assessment. 
 Probably the greatest weakness of the method as it stands is the working assumption that if all 
path durations can be raised above some threshold with a given confidence level then risk is 
acceptable. As a reviewer of an earlier version of this article emphasized, this ignores the variation in 
detectability of the paths, and the attraction to potential attackers of the less detectable paths. In the 
current method, the times assigned to the edges in these paths are the times it takes the attacker to 
negotiate them, not the times that the defender has in order to respond to the attack. An edge with a 
long negotiation time may offer very little response time if its detectability is low in some way. While 
attackers are negotiating some edge, they have access to some device at some level defined by the 
start node of that edge. So, to deal with the problem of variable detectability, an analyst would need to 
quantify the detectability δn of every node n in R that starts an edge. This detectability expresses for 
what fraction of time an attacker occupying a state is detectable in that state, which nominally starts at 
the time the state is attained and ends at the time a transition is made out of it. This is the time 
associated with an outgoing edge from that node. For example, if an attacker having root status to an 
office workstation has a 0.25 detectability level, offering an affordance to gaining user status on a 
SCADA workstation after an expected period of 5 days, or to root status after 10 days, the detectable 
period of these affordances becomes 1.25 and 2.5 days respectively. It is the detectability-adjusted 
path durations in the graph that then have to be compared with the time threshold. Of course 
detectabilities may themselves be uncertain, and the Monte Carlo procedure for finding shortest path 
durations to some confidence level would also then sample from probability distributions over 
detectability values. 
 Another complexity is that legitimate users’ adaptations may respond not just to changes in 
affordances but also to their evaluations of security. If users know a particular risk measure is 
intended to control a risk on a short compromise path then they might not undermine it through a self-
serving adaptation. This contingency between adaptation and threat perception reinforces the need for 
the analyst to make judgments. Our approach is just a framework that helps prompt and organize these 
judgments, but it does not avoid the need to make them and emphasizes the importance of what we 
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have called the ‘orientation process’ of properly familiarizing oneself, as an analyst, with social 
conditions in the organization under analysis. 
The study also neglected the problem of scalability. The organization used in the case study, and 
its systems, were small in scale. This made it suitable for a research study, but raises questions about 
how well the method will scale up. Assessing a specific system necessarily requires a detailed 
representation of that system, and an assessment based on identifying, testing and mitigating a 
minimum path through a failure graph necessarily requires a comprehensive identification of all 
possible paths that could be minimal. But how the judgmental and computational burden increases 
with the scale of the system depends on the structure of the system, and its decomposability. The 
economizing property of the method is its focus on the minimal path spanning the graph, which means 
that identification of risk controls, and identification of potential adaptations, is limited to this path. 
But – as we indicated earlier – this rests on the assumption that the path of minimal duration is always 
the worst case with some known probability. When this cannot be known with confidence, the analyst 
has to explore more paths and the method becomes less economical, and much more sensitive to 
increasing scale. 
We also make assumptions about the best approach to eliciting and expressing judgments about 
uncertainty and time, generally assuming such distributions are uni-modal, and assuming the 
distributions over different edges in the graph are independent. These assumptions need examining in 
any particular context. It is plausible, for example, that attacker capabilities could cluster around 
expert, highly-skilled actors and unskilled actors who only use existing, download-able exploits. Such 
clustering could produce bi-modal distributions. However, the core of the method is the identification 
of affordances, and the prediction of adaptations. Other distributions, and joint distributions, could be 
substituted for those we have used, and the use of simulation rather than an analytical approach means 
that substitution is relatively straightforward. Overall, the basic principle that risk analysis in contexts 
like this should not stop at analyzing the status quo, but also analyze candidate risk controls and 
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Table I. Estimates for the initial affordance graph 
 
Edge Nodestart Nodeend Timemin Timemode Timemax Exponent 
0 Start WiFi 1 10 21 1.8 
1 Start EngWSRoot 5 15 40 1.8 
2 Start OfficeWSRoot 5 20 40 1.8 
3 Start WLGateway 1 4 21 1.8 
4 WiFi EngWSUser 1 10 21 1.8 
5 WiFi EngWSRoot 1 20 30 1.8 
6 WiFi FileSVRRoot 1 16 21 1.8 
7 WiFi OfficeWSRoot 1 16 21 1.8 
8 WiFi FileSVRUser 1 10 21 1.8 
9 WiFi OfficeWSUser 1 10 21 1.8 
10 WLGateway EngWSUser 1 10 21 1.8 
11 WLGateway FileSVRUser 1 12 21 1.8 
12 WLGateway EngWSRoot 1 20 30 1.8 
13 WLGateway OfficeWSUser 1 10 21 1.8 
14 WLGateway FileSVRRoot 1 20 30 1.8 
15 WLGateway OfficeWSRoot 1 20 30 1.8 
16 WLGateway CamSVRRoot 1 4 21 1.8 
17 WLGateway CamSVRUser 1 3 21 1.8 
18 EngWSUser EngWSRoot 1 8 21 1.8 
19 FileSVRUser FileSVRRoot 1 8 21 1.8 
20 OfficeWSUser OfficeWSRoot 1 8 21 1.8 
21 CamSVRUser CamSVRRoot 1 4 21 1.8 
22 EngWSRoot ScadaRoot 1 4 21 1.8 
23 FileSVRRoot ScadaRoot 1 8 21 1.8 
24 OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot 1 6 21 1.8 
25 CamSVRRoot ScadaRoot 1 4 21 1.8 
26 ScadaRoot Harm 1 2 21 1.8 





Table II. Estimates of path durations 
 
Path t0.90(pi) E[t(pi)] Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 qerror (pi) 
0 28.0 44.9 Start WiFi EngWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.24 
1 25.6 41.1 Start WiFi OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.30 
2 33.0 49.0 Start WiFi EngWSUser EngWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.16 
3 27.2 41.7 Start WiFi FileSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.33 
4 34.0 50.1 Start WiFi FileSVRUser FileSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.15 
5 33.0 49.6 Start WiFi OfficeWSUser OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.15 
6 22.8 37.8 Start EngWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm   0.44 
7 23.5 39.8 Start OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm   0.38 
8 26.3 43.2 Start WLGateway EngWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.28 
9 26.3 43.8 Start WLGateway OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.28 
10 30.0 47.3 Start WLGateway EngWSUser EngWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.17 
11 27.1 44.4 Start WLGateway FileSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm  0.26 
12 32.0 49.0 Start WLGateway FileSVRUser FileSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.16 
13 32.0 47.9 Start WLGateway OfficeWSUser OfficeWSRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.23 
14 20.8 35.4 Start WLGateway CamSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm  N/A 
15 28.0 44.1 Start WLGateway CamSVRUser CamSVRRoot ScadaRoot Harm 0.26 























Fig. 1. The essential ecology 
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Fig. 2. Outline of the assessment method 
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Fig. 3. The affordance principle
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Fig. 5. The two-sided power distribution with tmin = 2, tmode = 4, tmax = 8, for n from 1.1 to 5 
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